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Religious Discrimination and
Title VII's Reasonable Accommodations Rule:
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
INTRODUCTION
In Trans WorldAirlines, Inc. v. Hardison' the United States Supreme
Court for the first time determined the extent to which an employer must
accommodate the religious practices of an employee in order to comply
with Title VII's2 proscription against religious discrimination. Prior to
the Supreme Court's decision, lower federal courts had reached different
results when interpreting the scope of the 1972 amendment3 to Title VII,
which requires an employer to make reasonable accommodation of an
employee's religious needs absent undue hardship to the employer's
business.
The Supreme Court held in Hardison that Congress did not intend
that an employer bear more than a de mininis cost to accommodate the
religious needs of its employees. In particular, the Court held that the
reasonable accommodations rule does not require an employer to abridge
a collective bargaining agreement, lose efficiency in plant operation or pay
overtime wages in order to accommodate the religious beliefs of its
employees. The Court felt compelled to reach this result because it
reasoned that any other interpretation would have given special treatment
to the employee who practiced a minority faith, and thus would have
discriminated against those employees who did not practice such a faith.
This Case Comment will trace the legislative history of the reasonable
accommodations rule and discuss the confusing pre-Hardison case law
that attempted to define and apply the rule. It will then evaluate the
Court's reasoning in Hardison in light of that legislative history and prior
case law. Finally, it will show that an interpretation of the reasonable
accommodation rule that requires an employer to bear more than de
minimis costs in accommodating the religious beliefs of its employees
comports with the first amendment's establishment clause,4 an important
issue skirted by the Court in Hardison.
I. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS RULE
AND PRE-Hardison CASE LAW CONCERNING THE RULE
A. The Birth and Development of the
Reasonable Accommodations Rule
1. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1964), as amended 42 U.S.C. §20003-20017(Supp.V 1975).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Supp. V 1975).
4. U.S. Co~sT. amend. I, which states in part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . .. ."
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Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act proscribes discrimination in
employment against an individual because of "race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin." 5  In the original version of Title VII, the language
pertaining to religious discrimination was broad and unclear. In fact the
terms "religion" and "discrimination" were not defined in the statute. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency re-
sponsible for the administration of Title VII, issued guidelines designed to
clarify the meaning of the statute. Its initial guidelines in 1966 indicated
that the employee had no right to demand that the employer accommodate
the employee's religious needs. 6  A year later, however, the EEOC
reversed its thinking and issued new guidelines recognizing "an obligation
on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommodations to the
religious needs of employees and prospective employees where such
accommodations could be made without undue hardship on the conduct
of the employer's business. '7 The EEOC did not attempt to define
"reasonable accommodation" or "undue hardship" but rather left defini-
tion to its review "of each case on an individual basis in an effort to seek an
equitable application of these guidelines to the variety of situations which
arise due to the varied religious practices of the American people." 8
The difficulties encountered in interpreting Title VII and the guide-
lines were demonstrated in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.,9 a 1970
decision that presented the first challenge to the reasonable accommoda-
tions rule. In Dewey an employee, who was discharged because he, for
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970) provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to
his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individu-
als race, color, religion, sex or national origin ....
6. See Edwards & Kaplan, Religious Discrimination and the Role of Arbitration Under Title
V71, 69 MicH. L. REV. 599, 614-19 (1971).
7. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1977) provides that:
Observation of the Sabbath and other religious holidays. (a) Several complaints filed with
the Commission have raised the question whether it is discrimination on account of religion
to discharge or refuse to hire employees who regularly observe Friday evening and Saturday,
or some other day of the week, as the Sabbath or who observe certain special religious
holidays during the year and, as a consequence, to not work on such days.
(b) The Commission believes that the duty not to discriminate on religious grounds, required
by section 703(a) (1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, includes an obligation on the part of the
employer to make reasonable accommodations to the religious needs of employees and
prospective employees where such accommodations can be made without undue hardship on
the conduct of the employer's business. Such undue hardship, for example, may exist where
the employee's needed work cannot be performed by another employee of substantially
similar qualifications during the period of absence of the Sabbath observer.(c) Because of the particularly sensitive nature of discharging or refusing to hire an employee
or applicant on account of his religious beliefs, the employer has the burden of proving that
an undue hardship renders the required accommodations to the religious needs of the
employee unreasonable.
(d) The Commission will review each case on an individual basis in an effort to seek an
equitable application of these guidelines to the variety of situations which arise due to the
varied religious practices of the American people.
8. Id.
9. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), affld by an equally divided court, 492 U.S. 689 (1971).
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religious reasons, refused to work on Sundays,"' alleged that his discharge
was in violation of Title VII. The employer defended by asserting that it
had merely acted in compliance with its collective bargaining agreement
with the United Automobile and Agriculture Workers of America. A
provision of the agreement required all Reynolds' employees "to perform
all straight time and overtime work required of them by the company
except when an employee [had] a substantial and justifiable reason for not
working . . . "" An increase in customer orders necessitated Sunday
overtime work, which was assigned on the basis of seniority.'2  It was
stipulated that Dewey was permitted to find a substitute worker, a
procedure that was available for absences of all types. Dewey, however,
refused to obtain a replacement because in his opinion that, too, would
violate the tenets of his religion.
The trial court applied the 1967 EEOC reasonable accommodations
guidelines and found that the company had violated Title VII by failing to
reasonably accommodate Dewey's religious needs. 13 The Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit reversed on the grounds that the 1967 guidelines
were not in effect at the time of Dewey's discharge and that the 1966
guidelines did not impose on an employer the duty to accommodate an
employee's religious needs. The court, however, stated that "even if the
1967 regulations are applied, we think that Reynolds complied with [the
reasonable accommodations rule] . . . by making a reasonable accom-
modation to the religious needs of its employees when it permitted Dewey,
by the replacement system, to observe Sunday as his Sabbath."1
4
The court went on to cast doubt on the validity of the 1967 guidelines:
"As we have pointed out, the gravamen of an offense under the statute is
only discrimination. The authority of EEOC to adopt a regulation
interfering with the internal affairs of an employer, absent discrimination,
may well be doubted."' 5 The Sixth Circuit held that, because failure to
accommodate an employee's religious needs is "entirely different" from
discrimination, to equate the two was "fundamental error."' 6 The court
concluded that Title VII only prohibits intentional discrimination and not
managerial decisions that evenhandedly apply a uniform rule to all
employees, even if the rule has a detrimental impact on an individual
10. The term Sabbatarian is used by the writer to describe people who observea particular day as
a Sabbath and who, according to the tenets of their faith, believe the Sabbath is a day of rest upon
which no work may be done. This belief is based upon a Bible passage that states: "Six da) shalt thou
labour, and do all thy work; but the seventh day is a Sabbath unto the Lord thy God, in it thou shalt
not do any manner of work . . . ." Exodus 20:9-10.
1I. 429 F.2d 324, 328 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
12. Id. at 327.
13. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 300 F. Supp. 709,711 (W.D. Mich. 1969). rev'd, 429 F.2d
324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
14. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d 324, 331 (6th Cir. 1970). aITd bv an cqualhs'
divided court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
15. Id. at 331 n.1 (emphasis in original).
16. Id. at 335 (Weick, J., on petition for rehearing).
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employee.' 7 The Sixth Circuit's decision was affirmed without opinion by
an equally divided Supreme Court, 8 and accordingly is not "entitled to
precedential weight."'
' 9
In response to the Dewey decision, Congress in 1972 amended Title
VII to incorporate the 1967 EEOC guidelines. 20 The legislative discussion
of the amendment, which consists solely of Senator Randolph's com-
ments, indicates that Congress, through its unanimous approval of the
amendment, intended that citizens working in the private sector be
protected against religious discrimination by private employers in the
same way that the Constitution provides protection against government
action that abridges religious freedom. 2' While the protection afforded by
the Constitution is not altogether clear,22 Congress may have been
thinking of Sherbert v. Verner.2' In Sherbert the United States Supreme
Court struck down a state statute that had been interpreted to deny
unemployment benefits to those who were unavailable to perform Satur-
day work because of their religious beliefs. The Court reasoned that to
disqualify from unemployment benefits a Seventh Day Adventist, who in
keeping with the tenets of her religion, refused to work on Saturday
"effectively penalize[d] the free exercise of her constitutional liberties. 2 4
The Court further declared: "For [i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to
17. Id. at 328.
18. 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
19. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,73 n.8 (1977) (quoting Neil v. Biggers,
409 U.S. 188, 192 (1972)).
20. The legislative history of the amendment reveals congressional approval of the guidelines
pertaining to religious discrimination that had been previously adopted by the EEOC:
Section 7010) - This subsection, which is new, defines "religion" to include all aspects of
religious observance, practice and belief, so as to require employers to make reasonable
accommodations for employees whose "religion" may include observances, practices, and
beliefs such as Sabbath observance, which differ from the employer's or potential employer's
requirements regarding standards, schedules, or other business-related employment condi-
tions . ..
The purpose of this subsection is to provide the statutory basis for the EEOC to formulate
guidelines on discrimination because of religion such as those challenged in Dewey v.
Reynolds Metals Company.
118 CONG. REC. 7564 (1972).
21. 118 CONG. REC. 705 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Randolph):
I think in the Civil Rights Act we thus intended to protect the same rights in private
employment as the Constitution protects in Federal, State or local governments, Unfortu-
nately, the courts have, in a sense, come down on both sides of the issue. TheSupreme Court
of the United States, in a case involving the observance of the Sabbath and job discrimina-
tion, divided evenly on this question.
This amendment is intended, in good purpose, to resolve by legislation-and in a way I
think was originally intended by the Civil Rights Act-that which the courts apparently have
not resolved. I think it is needed not only because court decisions have clouded the matter
with some uncertainty; I think this is an appropriate time for the Senate and hopefully the
Congress of the United States to go back, as it were, to what the Fotnding Fathers intended.
The complexity of our industrial life, the transition of our whole area of employment, of
course are matters that were not always understood by those who led our Nation in earlier
days.
22. See Section III infra.
23. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
24. Id. at 406.
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impede the observance of one or all religions or to discriminate invidiously
between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the
burden may be characterized as being only indirect."I
s
The theoretical foundation for congressional authorization to expand
the scope of Title VII's ban on religious discrimination was Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.,26 in which the Supreme Court held that conditioning employ-
ment on nonjob related test scores violated Title VII, as its effect was to
discriminate against Negroes. Dewey's holding that failure to accommo-
date an employee's religious needs is not synonymous with intent to
discriminate, and that Title VII only prohibits acts motivated by an intent
to discriminate, was impliedly overruled by Griggs. The Supreme Court
in Griggs held that intent to discriminate is not a prerequisite to finding a
Title VII violation. A rule neutral on its face can be discriminatory within
the meaning of Title VII if it is discriminatory in effect: "[G]ood intent or
absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures
... . Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of
employment practices, not simply the motivation. 27 Consequently, a
company rule neutral on its face yet discriminatory in its effect upon a
person's religious beliefs would be discriminatory within the meaning of
Title VII. Thus, the discussion in Griggs coupled with the legislative
history of Title VII appears to indicate an intention that Title VII outlaws
employment practices that have the effect of discriminating against an
individual employee's religious beliefs.
B. Court Interpretations of the Reasonable Accommodations Rule
Prior to Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison
While the 1972 amendment to Title VII codified the EEOC's reasona-
ble accommodations rule, it did nothing to further define it. The courts
were left with the task of applying the reasonable accommodation stand-
ard and determining the situations in which an accommodation would
place an undue hardship upon an employer's business. In accord with the
approach taken by the EEOC,28 courts have decided such Title VII issues
on a case-by-case basis. While it was clear that the employer had a duty to
make some attempt to accommodate an employee's religious needs, 29 the
25. Id. at 404 (quoting Braufeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961)).
26. 401 U.S.424(1971).
27. Id. at 432. Further support for this conclusion is found in the Court's determination that:
"The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discrim-
inatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice %hich
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice is
prohibited." Id. at 431. The discussion of the business necessity test by the Court in Griggs ex-
tended to prohibited forms of discrimination other than race: "What is required by Congress is the
removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate
inv'diously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Id.
28. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
29. See Johnson v. United States Postal Serv., 497 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1974); Shaffield v.
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amount of proof or the extent of the required accommodation was far
from clear. The only time the issue of undue hardship came before the
Supreme Court prior to Hardison was in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co."'
In Cummins, the court added little to the understanding of the provision,
stating only that "undue hardship is something greater than hardship."'
3
The lower federal courts have grappled with the meaning of undue
hardship and have reached differing results.
Courts have generally rejected defenses based upon intangible losses
incurred in accommodating an employee's religious needs. The fact that
accommodation is bothersome, disruptive or inconvenient has been held
insufficient to rise to the level of undue hardship.32 Fellow employees'
objections to and complaints about accommodating the religious needs of
another employee do not constitute undue hardship unless such
complaints are so severe that "chaotic personnel problems" result.
33
Similarly, the necessity of changing a company policy to accommo-
date an employee's religious practices has not generally been held sufficient
to constitute undue hardship. For example, in Young v. Southwestern
Savings & Loan Association,3 4 plaintiff resigned when she was told she
must attend meetings that opened with a prayer. The employee, an
avowed atheist, found this practice repugnant. In this situation the court
required the employer to adjust the "prayer" policy because it acted to
discriminate against a particular employee's religious" convictions.
An employer may prove undue hardship, however, by demonstrating
that the particular practice that discriminates against an employee's
religious beliefs is mandated by business necessity.36  In Claybaugh V.
Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 37 the court perceived the necessity
of balancing the employee's right to reasonable accommodation of his/ her
religious needs against the employer's right to avoid undue hardship:
The requirement upon an employer to make a reasonable accommoda-
tion to the religious needs of an employee is not unbending. However, an
employer cannot sustain its burden of showing undue hardship without first
Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv., 373 F. Supp. 937,944 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw,
Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. 1,5 (D. Or. 1973); Daniels v. Pacific Nw. BellTel. Co., 7 FAIR EIMNL. PRAC.
CAs. (CCH) 1323, 1324 (D. Or. 1972).
30. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), aff'dmem. by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976),
rev'd on rehearing, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
31. Id. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544,551 (6th Cir. 1975), afrd inein, byan equally
divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976).
32. Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 513, 520 (6th Cir. 1975).
33. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544, 550 (6th Cir. 1975), affd tnem. by an equally
divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), rev'd on rehearing, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
34. 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
35. Included in the term "religious" belief is what might be considered by some as "nonreligious"
belief, e.g., atheism. Id. at 143.
36. Grigg's v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) which held: "The touchstone is business
necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negro. cannot be shown to be related
to job performance, the practice is prohibited." Id. at 431.
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showing that it made an accommodation as an attempted remedy. As the
degree of business hardship increases, the quantity of conduct which will
satisfv the reasonable accommodation requirement decreases. The balancing
of reasohableness and hardship is what I believe Chief Justice Burger [in
Griggs] was referring to as the "business necessity" which would qualify as a
legitimate reason for discharging an employee.38
Two elements that would seem to enter the balancing process are the
financial and personnel resources of the employer. If the employer is a
large, successful corporation, undue hardship may be more difficult to
prove because of the employer's ability to reassign employees or incur
additional expense.39 Employers with fewer employees, however, have
less flexibility to modify work schedules and have successfully utilized their
inflexibility to lessen the extent of the accommodation required of them. In
Johnson v. United States Postal Service,40 for example, a small post office
branch that employed only five cle'ks-two full-time, two part-time and
one temporary-was sued by Johnson, a part-time employee who, for
religious reasons, refused to work on Saturdays and was discharged. The
court upheld Johnson's discharge, reasoning that the employer employed
so few people that it would suffer undue hardship if required to employ a
part-time employee who was not truly flexible.41
The need to preserve public safety is also persuasive as undue
hardship. In Dixon v. Omaha Public Power District,42 the difficulty of
obtaining a substitute for a highly trained lineman to correct high-voltage
power line malfunctions was found to constitute undue hardship because
to substitute an untrained employee could endanger the lives of workers
and threaten vital power supplies. Similarly, the absence of a fireman
from a department with strict staff limitations was found to constitute
undue hardship because it would increase the risk of harm to the lives and
property of citizens and firemen.43
The existence of a collective bargaining agreement or union contract
has sometimes been the basis for the employer's assertion that it does not
have the contractual flexibility to accommodate the employee's religious
needs. Frequently bargaining agreements provide for work allocations on
the basis of a uniformly applied seniority system that established objective
criteria for determining layoffs, promotion, shifts and certain advan-
tages.44 When accommodation of religious belief is not expressly incorpo-
37. 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Or. 1973).
38. Id. at 6.
39. Id. at 5.
40. 497 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1974). Title VII also prohibits discrimination in federal government
employment, including the United States Postal Service. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975).
41. 497 F.2d 128, 130 (5th Cir. 1974).
42. 385 F. Supp. 1382 (D. Neb. 1974).
43. United States v. Albuquerque, 10 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAs. (CCH) 771 (D. N. M. 1975).
44. Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A GeneralApproach
to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1598,1603 (1969).
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rated into the labor contract the employer who nevertheless accommo-
dates employees' religious practices that conflict with criteria of the
collective bargaining agreement may be in violation of that agreement.
4 5
Drum v. Ware, one of the few cases dealing specifically with this issue,
implied that the union contract was paramount to the employer's duty to
accommodate an employee's religious needs. More typically, in
Claybaugh v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co.,47 reliance upon its
contract with the union was not a defense to the employer's failure to
attempt an accommodation of the employee's religious needs. The
employer asserted that it could not accommodate a Seventh Day Adventist
who required every Friday night off to observe his Sabbath because to do
so would violate the union contract, which required the employer to
balance its work schedules in accordance with regular and premium wage
scales. The court held that the employer was under a duty to provide
temporary accommodation until the possibility of a permanent remedy
could be investigated.48
The court in Shaffield v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Services9
found that the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement might limit
the employer's duty to accommodate an employee's religious needs. The
particular agreement, however, did not have such a limiting effect because
seniority was not the only criterion the employer could use for according
employees preferential treatment.50 In addition, the court stated that
"even if the company were so bound [by the bargaining agreement], it may
well be that the company's burden includes seeking union consent to some
form of variance."'" In sum, the lower courts had not found adherence to
a collective bargaining agreement a good defense to an employer's failure
to accommodate an employee's religious needs.
45. While it seems unlikely that an employer would be held liable in damages to a union for
contravening a collective bargaining agreement in order to accommodate an employee's religious
needs, the issue has not come before the courts. The employer might, however, suffer litigation costs in
suits with the union to determine whether Title VII required the contravention of the collective
bargaining agreement and these costs might be considered undue hardship. These suits would
diminish as the case law established what accommodations Title VII does in fact require. That the
employer might suffer the loss of union good will is not persuasive, as the courts have uniformly held
that intangible losses are not undue hardship. See text accompanying notes 33-34 supra.
46. 7 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CASE. (CCH) 269 (W.D.N.C. 1974).
47. 355 F. Supp. 1 (D. Ore. 1973).
48. Id. at 5.
49. 373 F. Supp. 937 (M.D. Ala. 1974). This conclusion relies on the seniority system provision
of Title VII itself. See note 52 and accompanying text infra.
50. The provision of the collective bargaining agreement in issue stated:
The company agrees to the principle that shift and odd work week preference for available
jobs should be given to senior employees in each classification. It is recognized, however,
that it is impossible to operate the plant efficiently with all the senior employees in a particular
classification on any shift, and that classification seniority cannot be the sole determining
factor in making shift assignments.
Id. at 942.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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The question of conflict between a seniority system and the employer's
duty to accommodate the religious needs of its employees is further
complicated by a provision of Title VII itself. The provision states that
discriminatory conduct otherwise prohibited by the Act is permissible if
done "pursuant to a bona fide seniority ... system." 2
Thus, the lower courts' interpretations of the reasonable accommoda-
tions rule were inconsistent and sometimes confusing. With the law in this
unsettled state the Court granted certiorari to determine whether Trans
World Airlines, Inc. (TWA) had met its duty under Title VII to reasonably
accommodate the religious practices of one of its employees.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Hardison
A. The Facts
Plaintiff Hardison was hired by TWA in 1967 as a clerk in the Stores
Department of TWA's maintenance and overhaul base in Kansas City,
Missouri. The Department's importance to the Airline required that it
operate twenty-four hours a day, every day of the year. In the event of a
scheduled employee's absence, another employee was required to work an
additional shift or a supervisor was transferred from another area, even
though work in the supervisor's original area suffered. All employees,
including Hardison, were subject to a collective bargaining agreement that
contained provisions relating to shift preferences, days off, and vacations.
53
The system for dealing with employees' work schedule preferences was
based on seniority. Employees with the most tenure had first choice for
job and shift assignments; employees with less seniority had to work the
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or
different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or
merit system, . . . provided that such differences are not the result of an intention
to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Although prior to Hardison lower courts had seldom considered the argument thatTitle Vll itself
authorizes an employer to refuse to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs if that refusal is a
result of a bona fide seniority system, the Supreme Court used this provision of Title VII to buttress its
decision in Hardison. This is consistent with the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) and United Air Lines v. Evans. 431 U.S. 553
(1977) which established that a bona fide seniority system is protected even though that system might
perpetuate the effects of pre-Act or post-Act discrimination. 431 U.S. 324. at 348 n.30. Following
Hardison the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rendered two decisions consistent with the Hardison
holding: Southbridge Plastics Div. v. Local 759, Intl Union of United Rubber Workers of Am.. 556
F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1977); Charlier v. S.C. Johnson & Sons, Inc., 556 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1977).
53. The union contract provided in part:
The principle of seniority shall apply in the application of this Agreement in all reductions or
increases of force, preference of shift assignments, vacation period selection, in bidding for
vacancies or newjobs, and in all promotions, demotions, or transfers involving classifications
covered by this Agreement.
Except as hereafter provided in this pararaph, seniority shall apply in selection of shifts and
days off within a classification within a department ....
432 U.S. at67 n.l.
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assignments that had not already been chosen. The company recognized
that weekend assignments were the least preferred and therefore reduced
its work force to a minimum during this time period.
After approximately one year of employment with TWA, Hardison
embraced the tenets of the Worldwide Church of God. This religion
proscribes work from sunset on Friday to sunset on Saturday as well as on
certain specified but nontraditional holidays. Prior to this time, Hardison
had worked Friday evenings and Saturdays when scheduled. ,Hardison
discussed his religious beliefs with his supervisor, who agreed to attempt to
arrange work schedules so that Hardison would not be asked to work
during his Sabbath. Such an arrangement was not necessary at that time,
however, as Hardison voluntarily transferred to the 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m.
shift, and thus was not required to work from 7:00 a.m. Friday to 11:00
p.m. Sunday. After working this shift for approximately two months,
Hardison voluntarily transferred from Building I to Building 2 where he
could work the day shift Monday through Friday.54 The two buildings
had separate seniority lists; thus, as a result of the transfer, Hardison lost
the seniority that he had gained in Building 1.
The problem began when an employee who normally worked Satur-
days went on vacation and Hardison was asked to replace' him on the
Saturday assignment. Realizing that the vacation schedule would create a
problem with Hardison's observance of the Sabbath, Hardison's supervi-
sor arranged a meeting with himself, Hardison, and the union steward.
Three options were suggested and rejected. First, TWA suggested that
Hardison trade jobs or shifts with another employee to avoid working on
the Sabbath. The union would not agree to a trade unless it was made
pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, which required the shift
sought by Hardison to be put up for bids and awarded to the most senior
employee bidding for it. Since there were no jobs open for bid, and since
Hardison had insufficient seniority to bid for a shift having Saturdays off,
the suggestion was unacceptable.
Hardison then suggested that he work and be paid for only four days
per week, taking Saturdays off without pay. The union did not object to
this solution but the company rejected it because the work of the Stores
Department in which Hardison was employed was essential and every job
within that department had to be filled. To bring in an employee or
supervisor from another area would have left the other area understaffed,
and to employ someone not regularly assigned to work Saturdays would
have required TWA to pay between one-and-one-half and double the usual
rate of wages.
As a third suggestion, Hardison offered to work six days per week at
no additional pay if TWA would also agree not to schedule Hardison for
work on his Sabbath. This suggestion was rejected by the union as a
54. Hardison had married in the interim and felt that day work would be preferable.
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violation of the "forty hour work clause," which required that any work
beyond the standard forty hours per week be compensated by overtime pay
and be subject to seniority rights.55
Thus, no accommodation was reached and Hardison did not report to
work on the two Saturdays that he was expected to replace the vacationing
employee. Soon after, Hardison transferred to the twilight shift, which
required him to work from 3:30 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. In keeping with his
religious beliefs, however, he left work at sundown on Friday evening.
After a hearing, Hardison was discharged for refusing to work during his
assigned shift. Hardison filed suit for injunctive relief against TWA and
the union5 6 in district court. He charged that both TWA and the union
had violated Title VII by discriminating against him because of his
religious beliefs. Hardison's claim of religious discrimination was based
on the 1967 EEOC guidelines that require employers "to make reasonable
accommodation to the religious needs of employees" whenever such
accommodation would not work an "undue hardship,"" and on analogous
language adopted by Congress in the 1972 amendments to Title VIIL s
The district court, while upholdir2 the constitutionality of the 1972
amendment and EEOC guidelines as applied to this case, found thatTWA
and the union had fulfilled their obligations to accommodate Hardison's
religious beliefs.59 The court reasoned that although the EEOC guideline
referred only to the employer's duty to accommodate, the provision should
be interpreted to apply to unions as well as to employers. In this case,
however, the union's duty to accommodate Hardison's religious beliefs did
not require it to ignore its seniority system. The court buttressed its
opinion by referring to the seniority provisions of Title VII, which permit
different treatment of employees if based upon a bona fide seniority
system. 60 It decided that "[t]he seniority system was not designed with the
intention to discriminate against religion nor did it act to lock members of
any religion into a pattern wherein their freedom to exercise their religion
was limited.",6' Thus, the union had met its duty to reasonably
accommodate Hardison's religious practices.
The district court also held that TWA took appropriate action to
55. Brief for Petitioner Trans World Airlines, Inc. at 13;Trans World Airlines, Inc.v. Hardison.
432 U.S. 63 (1977).
56. As required, Hardison had exhausted his administrative remedies prior to bringing suit.
These remedies are prescribed in 43 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
57. 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1 (1977).
58. At the time of Hardison's discharge, the EEOC guideline *xas in effect but the 1972
amendments to Title VII had not yet been passed. The Court noted that %% hile an EEOC guideline that
varies from prior EEOC policy is not ordinarily entitled to great weight, the guideline is entitled to
sufficient deference to be accepted as a defensible construction of the pre-1972 statute when, as here,
Congress had codified that construction. The Court, therefore, did not consider %hether the 1972
amendments must be applied retroactively. 432 U.S. at 76 n.l 1.
59. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 375 F. Supp. 877 (W.D. Mo. 1974).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), quoted at note 52 supra.
61. 375 F. Supp. at 883.
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accommodate Hardison by holding several meetings in an attempt to hnd a
solution, aggreeing to accommodate Hardison's religious holiday obser-
vances, and authorizing the union steward to find someone willing to trade
shifts. To replace Hardison with another employee would have entailed
the payment of premium wages or would have left other work areas
without adequate coverage, either of which would have been an undue
hardship on TWA. The court further ruled that it would have been an
undue hardship for TWA to have changed Hardison's shift in violation of
the collective bargaining agreement.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed thejudgment for
TWA.62 It held that Title VII and the applicable regulations did not
violate the establishment clause of the first amendment, and that TWA had
not satisfied its duty to reasonably accommodate Hardison's religious
beliefs. The court found that there were several possible accommodations
within the constraints of the collective bargaining agreement that could
have been offered to Hardison.63 The court of appeals found it
unnecessary to decide whether reasonable accommodation included, when
necessary, the violation of seniority provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement, because as it viewed the facts, TWA had not sought, and
therefore the union had not refused, a possible variance from the collective
bargaining agreement. The United States Supreme Court reversed the
conclusions of the Eighth Circuit without reaching the constitutional
questions.
B. The Supreme Court's Reasoning
The Court identified the issue in Hardison as "the extent of the
employer's obligation under Title VII to accommodate an employee whose
religious beliefs prohibit him from working on Saturdays."" It disagreed
with the court of appeals "in all relevant respects" and found that "TWA
had made reasonable efforts to accommodate"65 Hardison's religious
needs. In the Court's view, each of the alternatives suggested by the
Eighth Circuit would have constituted undue hardship on the employer.
The Court agreed with the district court that TWA had made
reasonable accommodation of Hardison's religious beliefs because TWA
held several meetings in an attempt to find a solution to the problem,
accommodated Hardison's observance of nontraditional religious holi-
days, and authorized the union steward to seek an exchange of shifts with
another employee. The Court concluded that TWA had done all that
62. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc. 527 F.2d 33 (8th Cr. 1975), Because the district
court's findings with respect to the union were not questioned on appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
judgment in favor of the union without ruling on the substantive merits.
63. TWA could have permitted Hardison to work a four day week, filled his position with
another employee or arranged an exchange between Hardison and another employee. The court
simply disagreed with the district court's rejection of these options. Id. at 4042.
64. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 64,66 (1977).
65. Id. at 77.
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could reasonably be expected within the bounds of the collective bargain-
ing agreement to accommodate Hardison."
The Court next held that TWA was under no duty to arrange an
exchange of shifts that would contravene the union contract, stating that
absent "a clear and express indication from Congress) .. .an agreed-
upon seniority system [does not have to] give way when necessary to
accommodate religious observance." 67  The Court reasoned that the
seniority system represented a neutral way of allocating the nonpreferred
week-end work. If TWA abandoned this scheme and gave Hardison
Saturdays off, it would deprive other employees of their agreed-upon work
preference primarily because they did not adhere to a religion that
observed Saturday as the Sabbath. The Court made it clear that, "Title
VII does not contemplate such unequal treatment. The repeated,
unequivocal emphasis of both the language and the legislative history of
Title VII is on eliminating discrimination in employment, and such
discrimination is proscribed when it is directed against majorities as well as
minorities."6 The Court elaborated:
It would be anomalous to conclude that by "reasonable accommoda-
tion" Congress meant that an employer must deny the shift and job preference
of some employees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in
order to accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others, and we
conclude that Title VII does not require an employer to go that far.
69
The Court buttressed this interpretation by citing to section 703 (h) of
Title VII, which immunizes certain otherwise prohibited differential
treatment from Title VII attack when the differential treatment is "pursu-
ant to a bona fide seniority . .. system .. .provided that such differen-
ces are not the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin."70 Thus, the Court concluded that
"absent a discriminatory purpose the operation of a seniority system
cannot be an unlawful employment practice even if the system has some
discriminatory consequences."' Since the seniority system evidenced no
discriminatory intent. the Court reasoned that TWA did not engage in an
unlawful employment practice when it followed the dictates of its seniority
system.
66. Quoting from the district court's finding and the record, the Supreme Court pointed out the
Court of Appeals' error in finding that TWA had not suggested to the union the possibility of a variance
from the seniority system. Accordingly, the Supreme Court found thatTWA agreed to a variance but
the union had not. Unfortunately, however, the Court found it unnecessary to pursue the extent of the
union's duty to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs. The Eighth Circuit's opinion could be
read to require the union to waive or vary its collective bargaining agreement to accommodate religious
practices. Since the Supreme Court found that TWA had made reasonable accommodation without
seeking a varianceof the collective bargaining agreement, it did not address this issue.
67. Id. at 79.
68. Id. at 81.
69. Id.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), quoted at note 52 supra.
71. 432 U.S. at 82.
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The Supreme Court also rejected potential solutions that, unlike shift
trading, arguably would not have violated the collective bargaining
agreement. First, Hardison could have been allowed to work a four-day
week with a supervisor or other worker from another department filling in
for him on his Sabbath. Second, TWA could have replaced Hardison on
Saturday by paying premium wages to another employee. The Supreme
Court concluded that both solutions would have constituted an undue
hardship for TWA, either because of the lost efficiency resulting from
under-staffing other departments, or because of higher wage costs.
The Supreme Court declared that "[t]o require TWA to bear more
than a de minimis, cost in order to give Hardison Saturdays off is an undue
hardship. 72  The Court asserted that, like the "abandonment of the
seniority system, to require TWA to bear additional costs when no such
costs are incurred to give other employees the days off that they want
would involve unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their
religion."" The Court asserted that because the overriding purpose of
Title VII is to eliminate discrimination in employment, it would not, in the
absence of clear statutory language or legislative history to the contrary,
"construe the statute to require an employer to discriminate against some
employees in order to enable others to observe their Sabbath."74
C. A Critique of the Court's Reasoning
The Supreme Court's decision in Hardison is distressing for several
reasons. First, the Court seems to contradict the language of the reasona-
ble accommodations rule and the legislative history concerning the reach
of the rule to Sabbatarians. Second, the decision may discourage
accommodation of religious beliefs, since accommodation virtually always
imposes costs greater than de minimis. Last, the decision appears to
permit a collective bargaining agreement to determine the extent of the
accommodation required of the employer."
The language of the reasonable accommodations rule itself indicates
that the employer's duty to reasonably accommodate an employee's
religious needs is not terminated when more than de minimis expenditure
is necessary to achieve the accommodation. Congress adopted a require-
ment of reasonable accommodation unless undue hardship, not mere
hardship, would result. The Court in Hardison equated "undue hard-
72. Id. at 84.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 85.
75. Recent cases on the closely related topic of religious refusal to pay union dues have had
conflicting results. Two cases held that the employer must accommodate to the point of undue
hardship. McDaniel v. Essex Intern, Inc., 571 F.2d 338 (6th Cir. 1978); Cooper v. General Dynamics
Convair Aerospace Div., 533 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1976). One case held that reasonable accommodation
was unconstitutional in light of the establishment clause. Yott v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 428 F.
Supp. 763 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
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ship" with "more than a de minimis cost." This position is questionable
given the simple English usage of the words. . Moreover, it is inconsistent
with the Sixth Circuit's statement in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., affirmed
by the Court, that "undue hardship is something greater than hardship."
77
Perhaps an explanation for the Hardison Court's choice of this
interpretation of the statute was its desire to avoid deciding the potential
establishment clause question that the dissent thought would arise if an
employer was required to bear more than a de minimis cost in
accommodating an employee's religious beliefs.78
In holding that TWA had reasonably accommodated Hardison's
religious beliefs and that other alternatives would have resulted in undue
hardship, the Supreme Court appears to have disregarded the legislative
history of the 1972 amendment to Title VII. That history contemplates
unequal treatment of employees on the basis of their religion by rearrang-
ing work schedules to allow Sabbatarians time off from work to observe
their Sabbath. In response to the Court's holding in Dewey v. Reynolds
Metals Co. 79 that an employer had no duty to accommodate an employee's
religious beliefs because to do so would "discriminate against . . . other
employees" and "constitute unequal administration of the collective
bargaining agreement,"' Senator Randolph introduced an amendment
"to make clear that Title VII requires religious accommodation even
though unequal treatment would result.""1 His purpose for proposing the
amendment was to protect Saturday Sabbatarians from employers who
refuse to hire or to "continue in employment employees whose religious
practices rigidly require them to abstain from work in the nature of hire on
particular days. 82
Congress recognized that accommodating employees' religious
practices would result in unequal treatment; therefore, for the Court to say,
as in Hardison, that such an accommodation results in unequal treatment
begs the question. The Court in Hardison declined to hold that Title VII
authorizes unequal treatment without support from clear statutory
language or legislative history.83 Yet Senator Randolph's remarks in
proposing the 1972 amendment to Title VII, uncontradicted in subsequent
debates, certainly support the proposition that Congress intended to
76. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,92 n.6 (1977) (Marshall,J., dissenting).
Black's Law Dictionary defines undue as -more than necessary; not proper, illegal .... " BLA CK'S
LAW DIcTIONARY 1697 (4th ed. 195 1).
77. 516 F.2d 544,551 (6th Cir. 1975), qffd by an equally divided Court.429 U.S. 65 ( 1976). rev'd
on rehearing, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
78. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63.89 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
This point is discussed more fully at Section III infra.
79. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), qff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
80. Id. at 330.
81. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,89 (1977) (Marshall. J.. dissenting).
82. 118 CONG. REc. 705 (1972).
83. 432 U.S. at 79.
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permit unequal treatment for the benefit of Sabbatarian employees. The
Hardison Court ignored this legislative history, which clearly indicates
that unequal treatment of employees, including rearranging work
schedules to permit Sabbatarians to observe their Sabbath, is contemplat-
ed by Title VII.
The Court's decision appears largely to nullify the reasonable accom-
modations rule. Congress obviously intended that some accommoda-
tions of employee's religious beliefs be made, even if the employer incurs a
degree of hardship in doing so. Yet as the Court reads the rule, no
accommodations will be made since virtually every accommodation of the
religious practices of its employees would result in more than a de minimis
cost, as defined by the Court. An examination of the facts of Hardison
will indicate the narrow scope of the accommodation required of
employers.
The Hardison decision indicates that both the temporary payment of
overtime wages to a substitute employee and the efficiency loss of having
an employee from another area replace the Sabbatarian on the Sabbath
are examples of costs that are more than de minimis. The factual basis for
the Court's determination of more than de minimis cost is questionable.
Although the district court found lost efficiency and payment of premium
wages to be an undue burden, the dissenters in the Supreme Court asserted
that "the record is devoid of any evidence documenting the extent of the
efficiency loss . . . and while the stipulations make clear what overtime
would have cost, the price is far from staggering: $150 for three
months . . . . , The amount would have been even less for the two
weeks that Hardison was to replace the vacationing employee. If the
Court viewed the accommodation as permanent rather than temporary, it
is not clear either from the Court's opinion or from the facts of the case.
Thus, the holding of Hardison seems to be that the temporary payment of
wages and temporary efficiency loss of substituting an employee from
another area are more than de minimis in cost and therefore an undue
hardship. From these examples, it would appear that only the most minor
accommodations are required.
The Supreme Court's holding appears to permit a collective
bargaining agreement to play a critical role in the application of the
reasonable accommodations rule.85  Although the Hardison Court,
quoting Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., Inc., 6 agreed "that
neither a collective-bargaining contract nor a seniority system may be
employed to violate the statute, 87 it went on to state that "we do not
84. Id. at 92 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
85. See note 45 supra.
86. 424U.S. 747(1976). Seenot52supra.
87. 432 U.S. at 79 (quoting Franks v. Bowman Transp., Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976)).
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believe that the duty. to accommodate requires TWA to take steps
inconsistent with the otherwise valid agreement." 88
It is unlikely that Congress in enacting the 1972 amendment to Title
VII intended collective bargaining agreements to be controlling of the duty
to reasonably accommodate an employee's religious needs. Congress was
aware that, since most working people observe Sunday as the Sabbath,
Saturday Sabbatarians are at a disadvantage. 89 It can be assumed that
when Congress enacted the reasonable accommodations rule it was aware
that collective bargaining agreements existed and that the legislation
would affect employment relationships. In fact, the reasonable accommo-
dations rule was proposed, at least in part, because of the Court's adverse
ruling in Dewey, which involved the adverse impact of a collective
bargaining agreement on the accommodation of a Saturday Sabbatarian
who refused to work on his Sabbath. Thus, it seems likely that Congress
intended the 1972 amendment to Title VII to alter prior case law that had
allowed collective bargaining agreements to determine the extent of an
employer's duty to accommodate its employees' religious beliefs.
To augment its decision that TWA need not abridge its collective
bargaining agreement in order to accommodate Hardison's religious
belief, the Court pointed to the exception given seniority systems in Title
VII itself. Under section 703(h), conduct otherwise prohibited under Title
VII is permissible if done "pursuant to a bona fide seniority . . . sys-
tem."90 *This argument, however, is not persuasive because of the 1972
amendments, which instituted the reasonable accommodations rule,
followed section 703(h) by two years; the later statute takes precedence
over the earlier.91
By enacting the reasonable accommodations rule, Congress intended
to place Sabbatarians on an equal footing with the majority whose
employment typically does not interfere with the free exercise of their
religious rights. If, however, no flexibility exists in the application of a
collective bargaining agreement, then there can be no accommodation of
the religious needs of Sabbatarians, and they will therefore remain
disadvantaged. If Saturday work inevitably falls to the employee with
lowest seniority, such seniority provisions will effectively preclude the
employer from ever hiring Seventh Day Adventists, Orthodox Jews,
members of the Worldwide Church of God, and any others whose religious
beliefs proscribe work from sundown on Friday until sundown on
Saturday. In the words of the Eighth Circuit, "It is no answer to such a
88. Id.
89. See Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-
Allenton, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970), quoted at note 52 supra.
91. F. MCCAFFREY, STATUTORY CONSTRucTIoN (1953).
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person, or to the statute itself, that if he compromises his religious beliefs
for a time he may develop enough seniority to practice them again. 92
Resolving the competing interests at stake in the context of religious
discrimination in employment is a difficult task. 'And it may well be that
no better solution can be reached than attempting, on a case-by-case basis,
a balancing of the employee's interest in freely exercising his or her
religious beliefs against the employer's interest in avoiding economic
hardships. But to the extent that the Supreme Court is inclined to choose
a point, however indeterminate, beyond which that balance may not be
struck, it is regrettable that the Court has chosen the point of de minimis
costs. As a matter of policy and of law, the employer should be required to
bear more than de minimis costs, if necessary, to achieve a reasonable
accommodation of an employee's religious beliefs.
On the one hand, the exercise of religion is one of the fundamental
liberties Americans enjoy. On the other, the employment relationship is
one of the most important parts of any working American's life. For the
great majority of people who are Sunday worshippers, these two
important aspects of life do not conflict, for Sunday is the "working man's"
as well as "religious man's" day off. But for employees who are not
Sunday worshippers, the two do conflict, and the choce between religion
and employment-a choice most people never face-must be made. As a
matter of fairness, then, to such employees, accommodating their religious
beliefs does no more than grant them the same privileges enjoyed by
others. It is true that others may be inconvenienced to some extent by the
accommodation, but the inconvenience that results if the accommodation
is made would seem to be most often, if not always, outweighed by the
hardship on the employee seeking accommodation if the accommodation
is not made.
III. TITLE VII's REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS RULE
AND THE CONSTITUTION'S ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Some courts93 have questioned the validity of the reasonable accom-
modations rule under the establishment clause of the first amendment, but
most have upheld its constitutionality. 94 The Supreme Court has not
addressed the issue although given the opportunity to do so in both
Cummins v. Parker Seal Co. 95 and Hardison. In light of a rule of
statutory construction that requires the Court to avoid giving a statute an
92. Hardison v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 527 F.2d 33 at 41 n. 12, rev'd, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
93. See Reid v. Memphis Publishing Co., 521 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1975); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
94. See Draper v. United States Pipe & Foundy Cro., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975); Cummins v.
Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), ajrd mem. by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65
(1976); Riley v. Bendix Corp., 464 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1972); Jordan v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 399
F. Supp. 172 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Claybaugh v. Pacific Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 355 F. Supp. I (D. Or. 1973).
95. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), af'd mem. by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976),
rev'd on rehearing, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
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interpretation that raises constitutional questions,96 it might be argued
that the Court narrowly construed the reasonable accommodations rule in
Hardison in order to save the rule from the proscription of the
establishment clause.9 7 But the Court, in reading its decision, used much
the same rationale as it used in Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co.98 when
faced with a similar fact pattern. Because Congress enacted the 1972
amendment to Title VII to change the result of case law in general and
Dewey in particular, it may respond similarly to the decision in Hardison.
Thus, the constitutional issue must be faced. The following discussion
will suggest that Congress can pass legislation thiat is both constitutional
and protective of Sabbatarian rights.
The first amendment states in part that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof . . . ,,99 Ascertaining the proper relationship between the
establishment clause and the free exercise clause, which at times seem to
conflict with each other,'0° has raised numerous problems. Government
must sometimes accommodate religious interests to comply with its duty,
expressed in the free exercise clause,,not to prohibit the free exercise of
religion.'O The issue has often been raised regarding how much accom-
modation is permitted consistent with the establishment clause. 02  Thus
the Court has decided on a case-by-case basis which laws result in the
"establishment" of religion.
While the Court in Hardison chose not to determine the constitution-
ality of the reasonable accommodations rule, the dissent, in a brief
discussion, asserted that:
[T]he constitutionality of the statute is not placed in serious doubt simply
because it sometimes requires an exemption from a work rule. Indeed, this
Court has repeatedly found no Establishment Clause problems in exempt-
ing religious observers from state-imposed duties, even when the exemption
was in no way compelled by the Free Exercise Clause. 03
96. United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,369 (1971).
97. It is difficult to understand, however, how the de minimis requirement avoids an establish-
ment clause issue. See Section III infra.
98. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970), aTd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971). Both
cases state that to accommodate the religious needs of one employee results in unequal treatment of
other employees. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,81(1977); Dewey v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 429 F.2d at 330, aff'd by an equally divided Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
Further, both cases assert that there is nothing discriminatory in a collective bargaining agreement
that assigns week-end work without regard for religion. Trans World Airlines, Inc., v. Hardison, 432
U.S. 63, 80 (1977); Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F.2d at 329 (1970),affdbyan equally divided
Court, 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
99. U.S. Cosr. amend. I.
I00. Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668-69 (1970): "The Court has struggled to find a
neutral course between the two Religion Clauses, both ol which are cast in absolute terms, and eitner O
which, if expanded to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other."
101. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,312 (1952).
102. See Note, Establishment Clause Analysis of Legislative and Administrative Aid to
Religion, 74 CoLuJm. L. REv. 1175, 1176 (1974).
103. 432 U.S. 63,90 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Thus, the dissent found it unlikely that an establishment clause problem is
created when the government requires an employer to accommodate the
religious needs of its employees by excusing them from otherwise uniform-
ly applied work rules because no such problem is caused by "practitioners
from obligations owed the State.'
0 4
In Sherbert v. Verner10 5 the Court invalidated a state law denying
unemployment benefits to a Saturday Sabbatarian because, in keeping
with the tenets of her religion, she refused to accept employment requiring
Saturday work. The Court held that the state could not force a sincere
Saturday Sabbatarian "to choose between following the precepts of her
religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of
the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other
hand."'' 0 6 Although the basic holding was founded on the free exercise
clause, the Court went on to state that:
In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the "establishment" of the
Seventh-Day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of
unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday wor-
shippers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality
in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement
of religious with secular institutions which is the object of the Establish-
ment Clause to forestall.0 7
There are other indications that the reasonable accommodations rule
is not violative of the establishment clause. For example, Justice Harlan
dissented in Sherbert because the majority decision would require the state
to "single out for fifiancial assistance those whose behavior is religiously
motivated, even though it denies such assistance to others whose identical
behavior (in this case, inability to work on Saturdays) is not religiously
motivated."108 Yet he believed that the state, if it chose to do so, could
create an exception for Saturday Sabbatarians without violating the
establishment clause. "The constitutional obligation of 'neutrality,' "
according to the dissent, "is not so narrow a channel that the slightest
deviation from an absolutely straight course leads to condemnation."'10 9
Second, the Court in upholding the constitutionality of Sunday closing
104. Id. at 91 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Contrary to Justice Marshall's assertion, the Court's
"repeated" determinations that release from obligations imposed by the state poses no constitutional
problems were reached in the context of reconciling the establishment clause with the free exercise
clause; that is, thefailure to grant a release from state-imposed obligation raised free exercise problems,
The constitutionality of the reasonable accommodations rule, however, does not present a parallel
issue, for no one, as yet, argues that the government'sfailure to require accommodation of religious
beliefs in the private sector implicates the free exercise clause. Nonetheless, the case law referred to by
Justice Marshall is illustrative of the Court's approach to alleged violations of the establishment
clause, and will be useful in understanding the constitutional issues raised by the reasonable ac-
commodations rule.
105. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
106. Id. at 404.
1107. Id. at 409.
108. Id. at 422 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
109. Id.
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laws has noted that a number of states by statute exempt Saturday
Sabbatarians from the application of the closing laws. The Court has
stated this "may well be the wiser solution to the problem"' 10 thus implying
that there would be no "establishment" problem. Third, the Court has
exempted Amish children from attending school beyond the eighth grade
because, according to the Amish belief, attendance would threaten their
salvation. "Accommodating the religious beliefs of the Amish," the Court
stated, does not "support, favor, advance, or assist the Amish," but rather
"allow[s] their centuries-old religious society . . . to survive free from the
heavy impediment compliance with the Wisconsin compulsory-education
law would impose."''
Additionally, the Court has upheld against attacks under the estab-
lishment clause, laws that unquestionably require some people to adjust
their conduct to accommodate the religious beliefs of another. Two
examples are the selective service law, which excepted conscientious
objectors, 2 and a state law forbidding on Sunday certain activities within
a set distance from a place of worship."'
The Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether the
reasonable accommodations rule is violative of the establishment clause,
but in Cummins v. Parker Seal Co.," 4 the Sixth Circuit extensively
discussed the first amendment issues presented by the reasonable accom-
modations rule and found the rule constitutional. Cummins, afterjoining
the Worldwide Church of God, which proscribes work from sundown on
Friday to sundown on Saturday, refused to work on Saturday. For
approximately one year, the company accommodated his religious needs,
but when a fellow employee complained, the company again required
Cummins to work on his Sabbath. Cummins, following the tenets of his
religion, refused to comply and was subsequently dismissed. The Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held for Cummins under Title VII, finding
that the employer had not fulfilled "ts duty to make reasonable accommo-
dations of the religious needs of its employees.' 5 Over a strong dissent,
the court rejected the argument that the reasonable accommodations rule
was unconstitutional as an establishment of religion. The majority held
that the reasonable accommodations rule passed constitutional muster
under the tripartite test set forth in Committee for Public Education v.
Nyquist,16 while the dissent, relying on the same test, found that the
accommodations rule did not. For this reason, an analysis of Cummins
110. Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599,608 (1961).
I1. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,234-35 n.22(1972).
112. Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366,389-90 (1918).
113. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Markets, 366 U.S. 617, 627 (1961).
114. 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), affd by an equaly divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976),rev'don
rehearing, 433 U.S. 903 (1977).
115. 516F.2dat550.
116. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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reveals the two schools of thought about whether the accommodations
rule violates the establishment clause.
In Nyquist the Supreme Court established that "to pass muster under
the Establishment Clause, the law in question first, must reflect a clearly
secular purpose, . . . second, must have a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion, . . . and, third, must avoid excessive
government entanglement with religion .. .. 17 The majority in
Cummins found that the reasonable accommodations rule, like Title VII
as a whole, reflected a secular purpose. The purpose of the reasonable
accommodations rule was to prevent discrimination in employment and,
in particular "to put teeth in the existing prohibition of religious
discrimination.""' 8 The dissent, in contrast, stated that "[riather than
'putting teeth' into the Act, [the rule] mandates religious discrimination,
thus departing from the Act's basic purpose."
' 9
It seems fairly clear that the reasonable accommodations rule does
reflect a secular purpose. The purpose of Title VII was to remove
"artificial barriers" to employment when they worked to invidiously
discriminate on the basis of race, religion or other impermissible classifica-
tions. 120 Under the reasonable accommodations rule, the duty to accom-
modate an employee's religious beliefs is not absolute but terminates when
reasonable accommodation is not attainable short of an undue hardship,
thus indicating a purpose to eliminate reasonably avoidable hardships on
religious practices, rather than to actively support or finance certain
religions irrespective of cost. Senator Randolph, the amendment's
sponsor, stated the purpose to be "to resolve by legislation-and in a way I
think was originally intended by the Civil Rights Act-that which the
Courts apparefitly have not resolved.' 2' As noted earlier, the issue he was
addressing was the plight of Saturday Sabbatarians, whose religious
beliefs require them to abstain from work on the Sabbath.
Admittedly, these words and others 22 could be construed as evidenc-
ing a lack of secular intent. Nonetheless, the Court should find that the
amendment has a secular purpose because the Court in the past has
stressed the presumption of constitutionality. In Sunday closing law
cases, the Court has held that the purpose of the law is to provide for a
uniform day of rest, ignoring the historical connection between Sunday
117. 413 U.S. at 773 (citations omitted).
118. 516 F.2d at 552.
119. Id. at 556 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
120. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429 (1971).
121. 118 CONG. REc. 705 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Randolph).
122. Id. at 705:
My own pastor in this area, Rev. Delmar Van Home, has expressed his concern and distress
that there are certain faiths that are having a very difficult time, especially with the younger
people and understandably so, with reference to a possible inability of employers on some
occasions to adjust to work schedules to fit the requirements of the faith of some of their
workers.
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closing laws and religious practices. 23 The following programs were held
to have a secular purpose and thus survived constitutional attack: inclu-
sion of church-related colleges under the Higher Education Facilities Act
of 1963,24 aid to church-related colleges, 25 and tax exempt status for
houses of worship.1 26 Although held to be unconstitutional on other
grounds, several programs that aided parochial schfools were found to have
secular- purposes.127 In fact only a law requiring Bible reading in public
schools 28 and a law banning the teaching of evolution in public schools'29
were invalidated because of an impermissible legislative purpose. Both of
these cases concerned the fostering of a particular religious belief. Such is
not the case with the reasonable accommodations rule because it merely
requires that an employer accommodate religious needs, dictated by an3,
religion, to the point of undue hardship. Furthermore, even if Senator
Randolph's purposes were not uniformly secular, his overriding purpose
seemed to be the elimination of discrimination in employment that forces
an employee to abandon "one of the precepts of" their "religion in order to
accept work .... ,,130
Applying the second Nyquist standard, the majority in Cummins
found that the rule of accommodation has a primary effect that neither
advances nor inhibits religion but rather "guarantees job securi-
ty . . ,,31 The dissent found that the effect of the rule is to discrimi-
nate between those who practice a religion and those who do not.
Additionally, the rule discriminates between those who practice a Sab-
batarian religion and those who do not. 32
The primary effect of the reasonable accommodations rule is to
preserve and protect the employment opportunities of religious observers
unless the employer suffers undue hardship. The accommodation re-
quirement may incidentally benefit religion by allowing working men and
women to follow their creeds but it is clear that "not every law that confers
an 'indirect,' 'remote' or 'incidental benefit' upon religious institutions is,
for that reason alone, constitutionally invalid."'33  Indeed, in some
instances the general welfare of society demands regulation of conduct also
123. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961): Braunfield %, Brown, 366
U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown. Inc. v. McGinley. 366 U.S. 582 (1961):
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
124. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672(1971).
125. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
126. Waltz v. Tax Comm'n, 297 U.S. 664 (1970).
127. Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist,413 U.S.756
(1973); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
128. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
129. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
130. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,404 (1963).
131. 516 F.2d at 553.
132. Id. at 558 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
133. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,771 (1973).
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proscribed by religion: murder, polygamy, adultery, and so forth. The
government must be neutral, but the first amendment does not require it to
be hostile:
As the secular effect requirement has developed, the premise of government
neutrality in religious matters has been held to imply that, while no law may
be passed whose primary effect is to aid a particular religion or even religion
in general, a law may not be struck down simply becaue the secular effects
government seeks to produce . . . happen to be realized in a religious
134context ....
Although the historical correctness has been questioned,' the
Supreme Court in Waltz v. Tax Commission'36 stated: "[F]or the men who
wrote the religion clauses . . . the 'establishment' of a religion connoted
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign
in religious activity."' Clearly the reasonable accommodations rule re-
quires no sponsorship or financial support, the "primary evil" at which the
establishment clause was aimed, 3 8 or active involvement of the govern-
ment in religion. Interestingly, the most significant cases dealing with the
effect of a statute or government policy concern financial aid to education.
If awarding state funds to church-related institutions of higher educa-
tion, 139 and loaning textbooks and providing testing, guidance and other
services to parochial schools'40 do not have the primary effect of bene-
fiting religion, then it follows that requiring an employer to accommo-
date the religious needs of its employees, short of undue hardship, does
not primarily benefit religion.
Nor is the effect of reasonable accommodation to impermissibly grant
preferential treatment to individuals on the basis of religion. All aspects
of religious observance are protected by Title VII, including the rights of
the nonreligious. Indeed, the reasonable accommodations rule requires
that all religious and "anti-religious" beliefs be equally protected from
discrimination in employment. Title VII does not favor any one view.
Just as an employer must accommodate religious beliefs of a "believer" so
must it accommodate the religious beliefs of a "nonbeliever.'
' 41
Judging the applicability of the third part of the Nyquist test, the
majority in Cummins found that the reasonable accommodations rule
avoided excessive governmental entanglement with religion because "the
courts will have to determine simply whether the employer ha[d] made a
reasonable accommodation and whether an undue hardship [would]
134. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 839 (1978).
135. Id. at 819.
136. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
137. Id. at 668.
138. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,612(1971).
139. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S. 736 (1976).
140. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
141. See Young v. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F. 2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975).
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result. These issues [would] be considered in the labor relations context,
and their resolution certainly does not necessitate any government entan-
glement with religion."' 42  Reasonable accommodation involves no "ex-
cessive entanglement" or government in religion. The freedom to practice
one's religion is not absolute; 43 thus, government does involve itself in
some regulation impinging on religious interests and some entanglement
of government with religion results. The inquiry required for reasonable
accommodation, however, is essentially the same as that required in
Sherbert.144 The courts will simply have to make pragmatic determina-
tions of reasonableness and undue hardship to insure compliance with the
law. In fact, contact between government and religious organizations
would only occur in the courtroom, if At all. The sincerity of belief will
seldom be in issue145 but even if it is, the Court has on several occasions had
to determine the sincerity of a believer.' 46 Thus the reasonable accommo-
dations rule involves no excessive entanglement of government in religion.
The primary purpose of the reasonable accommodations rule is to
guarantee equal employment opportunity to religious observers. It
fosters job security by assuring that employers accommodate employees'
religious beliefs unless the accommodation would'produce undue hard-
ship. Finally, there is no more entanglement than has already been held
permissible in Sherbert. The reasonable accommodations rule, therefore,
meets all requirements of the Nyquist test. Employment is critically
important to most people. It is difficult to accept that the Constitution
forbids protection of a Sabbatarian who would otherwise be forced to
"choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting
benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her
religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.1 47
IV. CONCLUSION
In Hardison, the United States Supreme Court has dealt a decisive
blow to this nation's policy of hospitality to diverse religious beliefs. The
Court has held that under Title VII an employer need make no accommo-
dation to the religious needs of its employees if it would result in more than
a de minimis cost to the employer's business. Thus, the employer is
142. 516 F.2d at 553-54. Because the rule failed under the first two A'vquist standards, the
dissent found it unnecessary to consider the question of excessive entanglement. Id. at 556 (Cele-
brezze, J., dissenting).
143. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 187
(1878).
144. See text accompanying notes 105-09 supra.
145. Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 554 (6th Cir. 1975), affid mntr. by an equally
divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976), rev'd on rehearing, 433 U.S. 903 (1977); Draper y. United States
Pipe & Foundry Co., 527 F.2d 515 (6th Cir. 1975); Youngv. Southwestern Say. & Loan Ase'n, 509 F.2d
140 (5th Cir. 1975).
146. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
147. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,404 (1963).
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compelled to make only the most minor accommodations of an employee's
religious needs.
This decision is regrettable. First, the language of the reasonitble
accommodations rule itself indicates that more than de minimis cost is
required before the employer is absolved of its duty to accommodate. The
rule uses the term undue hardship. Undue hardship and "more than a de
minimis" cost are not equivalent measurements, yet the Court in this case
has made them equal. Second, the Court ignored the legislative history of
the 1972 amendment to Title VII which indicated congressional intent that
Sabbatarians be allowed to observe their Sabbath without sacrificing their
jobs. Third, by stating that an employer need not contravene a collective
bargaining agreement to accommodate an employee's religious needs, the
Court's holding permits a collective bargaining agreement to define the
extent of the employer's duty to make such accommodations.
Although the Court did not address the issue, it appears that accom-
modation of a Sabbatarian's need to observe the Sabbath would pass
constitutional muster. The purpose of the reasonable accommodations
rule, like Title VII as a whole, was to prevent discrimination in employ-
ment. Its primary effect is neither to advance nor inhibit religion but
rather to protect job security. Nor does the rule excessively entangle
government in religion; courts deciding cases that concern the rule would
have only to determine whether an undue hardship would result. The
reasonable accommodations rule, therefore, meets all the requirements of
the Nyquist test.
This nation has prided itself on its receptivity to individual beliefs and
practices. Religious freedom has been given high priority and respect since
the nation's inception. By enacting the reasonable accommodations rule,
Congress intended to insure that Saturday Sabbatarians could faithfully
practice their religion free from employment discrimination. The Hardi-
son decision effectively precludes accommodation of Saturday Sabbatar-
ians if it would entail temporary payment of overtime wages to another
employee, lost efficiency in the business operation, or violation of a
collective bargaining agreement. 41 Since this result appears to conflict
with congressional intent, perhaps Congress will take the initiative and,
consistent with the first amendment, directly overrule Hardison.
Marcia Swigart Hoyt
148. Indeed, since Hardison, Cummins v. Parker Seal Co., 516 F.2d 544 (6th Cir. 1975), afd
mem. by an equally divided Court, 429 U.S. 65 (1976) was vacated and remanded, 433 U.S. 903 (1977)
and the following cases have addressed the issue and either found undue hardship or remanded for
determination in light of Hardison: Jordon v. North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 565 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1977);
Ward v. Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 560 F.2d 579 (3rd Cir. 1977); H uston v. Local 93, U.A.W., 559
F.2d 477(8th Cir. 1977); Olin Corp. v. Fair Employment Prac. Comm'n, 67111. 2d 466,367 N.E,2d 1267
(1977).
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